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LAMA ABU-ODEH* 
The Politics of (Mis )recognition: 
Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia 
[C]omparative law has not normally been "transnational" at 
all, but rather it has grown within the frameworks of differ-
ent legal traditions, responding to "inner" needs of legal 
elites. From this point of view a first unexpected project that 
can be pursued by comparativism is "insulation." This strat-
egy has been peculiarly pursued in Britain, where the dis-
tinction between a Common law and a Civil law has been 
used to "create" and defend a national identity in the field of 
the law. But the same "insulation" project has been used by 
socialist lawyers to maintain a felt separation of socialist 
countries from the rest of the world. A project purported also 
by "Western" specialists with a strong professional interest 
in defining the peculiar subject of Soviet Studies as one disci-
pline within the Western academic world. 
Pier Giuseppe Monateri, The 'Weak Law': 
Contaminations and Legal Cultures! 
To sum up, Arab law today is a composite of: (1) a residual of 
Islamic law rules, whether in modern statutory form, as is 
the case with the laws of domestic relations, or in its classi-
cal form applicable in Saudi Arabia as the common law of 
the land where no statutory legislation exists, (2) the Euro-
pean-based codes, which constitute the backbone of the law 
in the private and public law fields, some of which succeeded 
in incorporating certain Islamic law rules of contracts and 
obligations considered viable under today's conditions, and 
(3) a growing number of major, topical legislation, in the 
form of comprehensive statutes in such fields as arbitration, 
banking, copyright, environment, maritime, social security, 
taxation, and so forth. 
George N. Sfeir, The Place of Islamic Law 
in Modern Arab Legal Systems: A Brief for 
Researchers and Reference Librarians2 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, LL.B., University of 
Jordan; LL.M., University of Bristol, UK; MA Philosophy, University of York, York, 
UK; S.J.D., Harvard 
1. 1 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, no. 3, art. 5, at 6 (2001), at http://www.bepress. 
com/gj/advances/vol1/iss3/art5. 
2. 28 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 117, 121 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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Islamic law courses are being offered to students of Middle East 
area studies as well as law students in various American universities 
and law schools. The intention seems to be to educate them on law 
unique to the Islamic world. Things "Islamic" have of course attracted 
renewed and more dispersed interest since September 11, especially 
so in the case of Islamic law. For it was commonly assumed that it 
was some rule grounded in Islamic religious sources that the attack-
ers saw as licensing their acts. 
However something peculiarly worthy of notice is taking place in 
these pedagogical acts of instruction on Islamic law. The reading 
materials assigned to the students in these courses tend towards a 
particular construction of "Islamic law" that ultimately produces 
what I would describe a "fantasy effect." The fantasy is to the effect 
that Islamic law is a foundational category for anyone attempting to 
understand law in the Islamic world. Both the diachronic narrative of 
Islamic law's emergence and development and the synchronic inter-
relationship of the various contemporary legal phenomena in the Is-
lamic world as constructed in these readings produce this "fantasy 
effect." Its modus operandi is a rhetorical slippage given effect to by 
the readings that gradually and almost imperceptibly substitutes "Is-
lamic Law" for "Law in the Islamic countries." 
The consequence? The European legal transplant in the Islamic 
world is never seriously explored or theorized in these materials. If 
referred to, it is either in its moment of arrival as a foreign import, or 
in its moment of fantasized departure as a thing to be displaced and 
replaced with something more authentic: "Islamic law." Its absence 
from the materials as the positive law of the Islamic world, that in-
forms its codes, treatises, law reports, legal institutions, legal curric-
ula in law schools is striking. This produces the paradoxical 
phenomenon that whereas in most other regions, scholars are typi-
cally invited to pay attention to law outside of positive law, in the 
Islamic world one has to do the opposite: call attention to law "in the 
books, in the classroom, and in the courts." 
The instructor might claim that because this is a course on Is-
lamic law, it is that which needs to be at the center of the readings 
and not the legal transplant. The latter needs a different course with 
a different title and a different discursive emphasis. But no such 
course seems to be forthcoming anywhere. More importantly though, 
a course on Islamic law can be taught that does not exaggerate the 
power of Islamic law to signify legal practices in the contemporary 
Islamic world. This course would mark the moment of historic inter-
ruption of the Islamic legal system and its loss of place for the trans-
plant. The course would then proceed to discuss and explore with 
earnest interest the transplant: its nature, its rules, its operative 
logic, its mode of reasoning, the theory embedded in it ... etc. 
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The relationship between law and law in these course materials 
is thus reversed. Instead of treating the transplant as the way to un-
derstand the contemporary Islamic law as it exists as trace, the medi-
eval Islamic legal is used to understand the contemporary legal 
transplant as if the latter were a mere itch on what is otherwise a 
Muslim body. In other words, the Islamic law instructor in the US 
treats Islamic law as some kind ofa natural law the dictates of which 
declare positive law in the Islamic world as a wrong and misplaced 
derivation. This being the case, the latter should be ignored or forgot-
ten through pedagogical neglect. 
Thus courses on law in the Islamic world taught in the US bear 
almost no relationship to courses on law taught in the Islamic world 
itself. They certainly bear no relationship to my own legal education 
at the Faculty of Law in Jordan University. To graduate with a law 
degree, I was instructed on the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the 
Commercial Code, Corporation Law, Civil and Criminal Procedure, 
Evidence .... etc., all codes designed to mimic, repeat and copy Euro-
pean codes. My education on Islamic law was limited to three courses 
which I had to take in a different school called The Department of 
Shar~.a3 and included a course on Marriage and Divorce, one on In-
heritance and Wills, and one on Islamic Jurisprudence. Nine credits 
on Islamic law for the four years I was studying law in an Islamic 
country! 
A similar idea manifests itself in the writings of Islamic law 
scholars in the US. 
In an odd reversal in which history speaks as present, the Is-
lamic law scholar typically indulges all of us in an elaborate discus-
sion of, say, the medieval "sunni legal thought" when the topic of 
rights and constitutionalism, twin concepts of Western post-enlight-
enment, is raised,4 as if contemporary constitutions of the Islamic 
world, constructed out of such post-enlightenment ideas, are of no rel-
evance whatsoever. Similarly, another scholar "tries" Osama Bin La-
din according to medieval Islamic criminal rules,5 as if this were a 
law to which contemporary Muslims relate, or are even aware of, 
when they have adjudicated their criminal cases for over a century 
3. In order for me to attend classes at the Department of Sharia at the Univer-
sity of Jordan, I had to "modify" my secular clothing by wearing a loose scarf on my 
head and get used to sitting with the other women in the class in the back rows while 
men "manned" the front rows. I also had to get used to the fact that the Sharia profes-
sors took attendance by calling the men with their first names and calling women by 
assigning them numbers! As soon as I ventured out of the Sharia building, I took off 
the scarf and happily walked back to my law school, where such activities did not take 
place! 
4. Khaled Abou EI Fadl, Constitutionalism and the Islamic Sunni Legacy, 1 
UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67 (2001). 
5. Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of Terrorists under Classical Islamic Law, 43lIARv. 
INT'L L.J. 53 (2002). 
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now in courts that are enactments of twentieth century European 
criminal jurisprudence. A third waxes eloquent on Islamic law's posi-
tion on adultery, stoning and lashing, in a recent conference on wo-
men and Islamic law, as if such punishments have not been banished 
from the majority of criminal codes in the Islamic world for over a 
century now.6 
It is not only Islamic law scholars and instructors who are com-
mitted to this "supremacy of Islamic law" approach. Comparatists do 
too. While traditionally preoccupied with learning about the nature of 
the legal transplant and the various lives the transplant acquires in 
different national contexts, at least within the American and Euro-
pean contexts, comparatists seem least interested in pursuing such 
an approach in the context of the Islamic world. As if sworn to its 
exoticism and ultimate difference, these scholars are more likely to 
search for Islamic law when they look at Islamic countries, only to, 10 
and behold, find it, typically in family law rules (Donald L. 
Horowitz),7 and when in search of a legal family to adopt law in the 
Islamic world, they readily give the "child" to the tender and warm 
embrace of "Muslim law" (Rene David)8 or to "traditional law" (Ugo 
Mattei).9 
The combination of presence (of Islamic law) and absence (of le-
gal transplant) in the course materials assigned by Islamic law in-
structors, the scholarship on law in the Islamic world by Islamic law 
scholars as well as by Comparatists, betrays an ideological project. I 
would describe it as an identitarian one with an underlying teleologi-
cal notion of history. By identitarian I mean the positing of a com-
mon identity shared by all "Muslims" based on their religio/legal 
beliefs, a project that to my mind recalls what I called earlier the 
"fantasy effect." "[F]antasy is the means by which real relations of 
identity between past and present are discovered and/or forged."lo In 
this instance what is being "fantasized" through the assigned materi-
als and the scholarship is the identity between Muslims in their past 
and Muslims in their present, as well as the identity between Mus-
lims' relationship to their law in the past and their relationship to 
their law in the present. ll 
6. Kecia Ali, Sex, Virginity, and Honor in Islamic Law (2004) (unpublished paper 
presented at the conference Islam and the Law: The Question of Sexism, held at the 
University of Texas in Austin, Texas). 
7. Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform 
and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMPo L. 543 (1994). 
8. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY 482 (3d ed. 1985). 
9. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Le-
gal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMPo L. 5 (1997). 
10. Joan W. Scott, Fantasy Echo: History and the Construction of Identity, 27 
CRITICAL INQUIRY 284, 287 (2001). 
11. Or to borrow again Joan Scott's words: "commonality among [Muslims] does 
not preexist its invocation but rather ... it is secured by fantasies that enable them to 
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This ideological project has an underlying teleological notion of 
history because it assumes that the "spirit" of Islamic law marches 
through history unencumbered by the world's contingencies (in this 
case the legal transplant). The latter might sever the relationship be-
tween Muslims-in-the-world with the spirit of their law, but this is 
only momentary and is destined to end. The spirit, ultimately, will 
be joined with its believers because the contingencies of history are 
inconsequential for this pre-ordained relation between believer and 
idea.12 Short of this moment of re-joining with the spirit, Muslims are 
destined to feel the bite of existential alienation .... 
Or so the fantasy goes .... 
ISLAMIC LAW AND MUSLIM IDENTITY: FANTASTICAL GROUNDINGS 
In one of the most succinct attempts at weaving an identitarian 
narrative around Muslims and Islamic law, the Islamic law scholar 
Wael Hallaq13 contends that for us to understand the events of Sep-
tember 11, it is important that we must first appreciate: 
[T]he indelible connection that Muslims feel with God, a tie 
that the Christian West for the most part severed long ago. 
The idea of giving to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God 
what is God's does not wash in the Muslim world-view, for 
Caesar is only a man, and men, being equal, cannot com-
mand obedience to each other. Obedience therefore must be 
to a supreme entity, one that is eternal, omnipotent, and om-
niscient. If modernity has effected profound changes in Is-
lamic culture (and no doubt it has), it has failed in the most 
important respect, namely, to alter or sever this tie with the 
divine.14 
For Hallaq, it is the "indelible" connection to God that makes one a 
"Muslim," a connection that seems resistant to forces of history, in-
cluding the most stubborn one witnessed thus far the world over: mo-
dernity. For whereas the Christian West has severed this connection 
long ago, Muslims find this connection un-severable. Accordingly, it 
seems redundant to describe a Muslim "religious" since what makes 
transcend history and difference." Id. at 288 (note that I've substituted the word 
"Muslims" for that of "women"). 
12. This notion of history that I describe is associated with religious notions of 
history generally shared by Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For an explanation, see 
Graham Nicholson, The Locus of Meaning in the Text of History, 1 ACCESS: HISTORY 
19, 19-20 (1997), at http://www.uq.edu.auiaccess_history/one-one/meaning.pdf. 
13. Wael Hallaq teaches Islamic law at the University of McGill in Canada. I in-
clude him in this article because of his deep influence on Islamic law scholarship in 
the United States. The various books he has published in which he conducts a histori-
cal investigation of Islamic law and Islamic legal theory have gained him a highly 
reputable and influential status in U.S. academia. 
14. Wael B. Hallaq, "Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HAsTINGS L.J. 1705, 
1706 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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one a Muslim in the first place is to have an unsevered, (indeed, un-
severable) connection with God by definition. To be a Muslim is to be 
of the faithful. 
Having first asked the readers to appreciate Muslims' "indelible 
connection to God," the next thing Hallaq asks them to do is appreci-
ate the Muslims indelible connection to God's law presented as neces-
sarily flowing from the first connection: 
It would in no way be an exaggeration to argue that law was 
the defining characteristic of Muslim societies and civiliza-
tions throughout the centuries, and in every corner of the 
Islamic world, ranging from Indonesia and Malaysia to Alge-
ria and Morocco. As Joseph Schacht, the distinguished fa-
ther of Islamic legal studies in the West, put it some forty 
years ago, "Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, the 
most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core 
and kernel of Islam itself .... [T]he whole life of the Mus-
lims, Arabic literature, and the Arabic and Islamic disci-
plines of learning are deeply imbued with the ideas of 
Islamic law; it is impossible to understand Islam without un-
derstanding Islamic law." ... One may even add that law 
defined not only the Muslim way of life, but also the entire 
culture and psyche of Muslims throughout fourteen centu-
ries. Islamic law governed the Muslim's way of life in liter-
ally every detail, from political government to the sale of real 
property, from hunting to the etiquette of dining, from sex-
ual relations to worship and prayer. It determined how Mus-
lims conducted themselves in society and in their families; 
how they designed and ordered their cities and towns; and, 
in short, how they viewed themselves and the world around 
them. If Islamic civilization, culture, or state ever consti-
tuted a regime of any kind, it was one of nomocracy. There 
has never been a culture in human society so legally oriented 
as Islam. I5 
Where did this law that was "the warp and woof' of Muslims' lives in 
pre-modern times come from? It was derived by medieval jurists com-
mitted to reading the words of God in his holy text through a con-
cisely formulated "hermeneutics."16 These jurists were educated in 
15. Id. at 1707 (emphasis added). 
16. The Muslim court applied what we may call 'jurists' law," an expression bear-
ing much significance. Islamic law is properly defined as jurists' law because it is a 
product of the jurist's hermeneutical labors, based, as it were, on the revealed texts 
and the methods of interpretation that were seen to derive from these very sources. 
The Quran stood supreme as an authoritative legal text, but the major bulk of the law 
derived from the Sunna of the Prophet, those utterances and deeds attributed to the 
founder of Islam. Juristic consensus and the inferential method known as qiyas pro-
vided the mechanisms for elaborating, in terms of legal reasoning, the raw subject 
matter of the revealed texts. Without qiyas and the entire system of legal hermeneu-
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institutions that were autonomous of the rulers' influence and they 
interpreted the holy texts independent of rulers' interests. Their au-
thority as interpreters of God's law was such that they were able to 
force even rulers to submit to God's law. In the olden times, according 
to Hallaq, jurists were the gatekeepers of civil society, preserving its 
autonomy, defending it from the tyranny of the state as they spoke 
God's law to ruler's political power.17 
Then, according to Hallaq, something awful and tragic happened 
in the nineteenth century. At the instigation of colonial powers, the 
nation state was established in the Islamic world and with it the 
abandonment of Islamic law and the adoption of the European legal 
transplant.1s The tragedy for the Islamic world was threefold: first, 
law was secularized: 
tics developed by the jurists, the revealed texts would remain empty of legal signifi-
cance, for it was this hermeneutic that brought out their legal import. In other words, 
God did not reveal a law proper but only textual signs or textual indications that 
required the intervention of the human rational faculty in order to bring out into a 
human reality what was seen as a sacred law. Thus, if God revealed the basic building 
blocks of the law, it was the jurists who built the House of Shari'a. 
17. As Hallaq notes: 
Politics was subsidiary to law and entirely subservient to it. This is a 
fact of paramount importance, dictating much of what happened between the 
rise of Muhammad and the early nineteenth century. The Caliph and Sultan 
saw themselves and were seen by all others as subject to the holy law of God. 
And sure enough, notwithstanding the occasional violation, both rulers and 
their agents took this divine superiority for granted and as a rule conducted 
themselves in accordance with its dictates. If there is one inalienable feature 
of the Muslim body politic and legal culture it is the prevalence of the rule of 
law, with the political sovereign accepting without challenge the supreme 
authority of the divine law and hence that of the jurists and judges-custodi-
ans of the law and its interpreters as well as the civic leaders of the Muslim 
communities wherever they were present. No ruler or political might could 
challenge the divine law and its spokesmen. The rich, the powerful, and the 
poor, from sultan to pauper, all stood as equals in the presence ofthe humble, 
informal Muslim court to receive judgment. There were no special rules for 
the mighty, and none could question their eternal submission to the law of 
God. The Law was deemed to stand above anything human. 
It is this recognition on the part of the state and its functionaries that 
has preserved the distinction between worldly power and the province of the 
law. And it is this recognition that rendered the law so remarkably indepen-
dent throughout twelve centuries of Islamic history. The state's legal power 
was accordingly limited to the appointment and dismissal of judges, and no 
doubt the state used this prerogative to exercise as much influence as it could 
muster. But the state had also accepted the fact that, once the judge was 
appointed, it could do nothing but bow to the Law as applied by the court. 
Judicial independence and the rule of law no doubt represented two of the 
most striking features of traditional Islamic cultures. 
Hallaq, supra note 14, at 1708. 
18. Hallaq states: 
By the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had ceased to threaten 
the gates of Vienna and had begun a process of decline, while European 
states experienced a simultaneous technological and economic advance. This 
rise ushered in a new relationship between the Islamic East and Europe, 
which embarked on a policy of colonization aimed at its immediate Muslim 
neighbors as well as the Muslim kingdoms and sultanates in far away lands. 
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No longer could the traditional jurists rely on their herme-
neutical methods to determine what the law was; the new 
order had severed the organic link between the divine texts 
and the positive legal stipulations deriving therefrom. The 
mechanism of interpretation, the backbone of Islamic law 
and the only link between the divine and the human, ceased 
to operate. 19 
And second, through secularization, especially that of law, Muslims 
experienced alienation: 
The century between the 1870s and 1970s tells a story of co-
lossal alienation whereby Muslims were systematically ex-
posed to a process of deprivation, first of their religious 
values and second of their native, age-old culture. And let 
there be no doubt that the decimation of their traditional law 
is largely responsible for both forms of alienation and depri-
vation. In fact, there is no other way of explaining the recent 
rise of the Islamist and fundamentalist movements through-
out the Muslim world.20 This is undeniable. But at deeper 
psychological and cultural levels, the alienation stems from 
a severe disconnection with God; a connection that they have 
come to experience upon their encounter with the West, with 
modernity and its hegemony.21 
And third, secularization through codification led to the tyranny of 
the contemporary Islaniic nation state: 
Having codified the law on the basis of Western legal mod-
els, and having virtually decimated the infrastructure of the 
traditional legal profession, the nation-state jettisoned Is-
lamic law altogether and reigned supreme as the unchal-
lenged center of legal and political power .... a new political 
The British, French, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Dutch, among others, con-
quered massive territories and exercised direct and indirect colonial control 
over them. One of the last to fall into disarray was the Ottoman Empire, 
most of whose possessions, save for modern day Turkey, were divided in 1916 
among the British and the French in what is known as the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. With this near-total conquest, the Muslim world, except such 
(then) impoverished regions as Saudi Arabia, faced an unprecedented wave 
not only of military and economic colonization but, more importantly, the 
modernizing effects of Europe. But even before World War I, the Ottoman 
Empire had been forced into a program of political and administrative re-
structuring whereby the initial steps toward government centralization were 
affected. This restructuring aimed at, and resulted in, the formation of what 
was to become the nation-state, an entity alien to the indigenous cultures of 
Muslim lands. It is in this newly emerging phenomenon that one must seek 
an explanation for the ultimate demise of traditional law and legal 
institutions. 
[d. at 1711-12. 
19. [d. at 1713 (emphasis added). 
20. [d. at 1715 (emphasis added). 
21. [d. at 1714. 
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order was allowed to emerge without the benefit of the tradi-
tional legal structures that had systemically controlled the 
access by political authority to real wealth (mostly concen-
trated in civil society but administered by the traditional le-
gal profession) as well as to legal and absolute political 
power. In other words, there no longer was an independent 
legal system that could restrain the powers of the new 
autocracies.22 
797 
And why would codification lead to tyranny? Why hasn't the separa-
tion between God's law and sultan's power not been replaced by the 
separation between "code" and political power, otherwise known in 
the modern Western state as "separation of executive, legislative and 
judicial powers"? Hallaq has this to say: 
Codification is not an inherently neutral form of law-making, 
nor is it an innocent tool of legal practice, devoid of political 
or other goals. It is in fact a deliberate choice in the exercise of 
political and legal power, a means by which a conscious re-
striction is placed upon the interpretive freedom of jurists, 
judges and lawyers. 23 
22. Id. at 1713-14. 
23. Id. at 1712-13 (emphasis added). It is very hard to take Hallaq's narrative of 
the "tragedy of the Muslims" seriously. To disbelieve the tragedy narrative however is 
not to deny the brutal and destabilizing impact of colonialism on Islamic societies. 
When it comes to law, it seems much more plausible to argue that in those instances 
in which law was put to use to the service of the colonial power or its client native 
ruling class, it was the content of the rules rather than (the loss of) its cultural source 
of origin that had a destabilizing effect on Muslims. To confuse the law's distributive 
impact with its cultural source is to assume a) that Muslims' sense of alienation, rage, 
and discontent results only from the absence of the Godly source of the rules and not 
from the impact of those rules on their lives (!), that all law that was claimed to be 
God's law was experienced as a "good" by Muslims; and b) that God's law is more 
immediately knowable than secular law and is therefore unique in its immunity from 
multiple and ideologically driven interpretations. The latter would be an odd claim to 
make since Hallaq more than anybody else is aware of the range of interpretations of 
God's law that existed in medieval times leaving little doubt that while God might be 
clear about His own intentions, we are only aware of them through human interpret-
ers and humans are not immune from biases and preferences of their own. The para-
dox in Hallaq's position stems from his uncritical attitude towards Islamic law as 
religious law. He suggests that unlike codified law, which is openly ideological accord-
ing to him, God's law rises above human and state preoccupations and biases. He 
implies that the Muslim jurists' hermeneutics exemplified by analogy has somehow 
made it possible to have access to this supra-ideological will. Hallaq seems unaware 
that what he says about God's law only repeats what classical legal thinkers in the 
US said about law in the nineteenth century. Instead of jurists, in whom Hallaq 
places his trusting faith, the CLTs placed theirs in judges and their deductive and 
analogical hermeneutics which they thought guaranteed the objectivity and neutral-
ity of the law they made. As we know, such claims were more or less put to rest by the 
devastating attacks of the legal realists in the early twentieth century and the critical 
legal thinkers later on. Even more importantly, Hallaq fails to mention similar at-
tacks made on analogy and its claim to objectivity in the history of Islamic law itself 
(Shatibi, Ibn Rida, etc.). 
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So according to Hallaq, first there was God who begot the law who 
begot the Muslims. Then colonialism, the nation state and the legal 
transplant happened. As a result, Muslims found themselves suffer-
ing a lack they have since then sought to bridge, one that is created 
by the absence ofthe law that mediated their relationship to a God in 
whom they never lost faith. It is this lack, gap, desire, call it what you 
will, that is at the heart of Muslim's contemporary sense of aliena-
tion. And yet in order for the alienation thesis "to stick," one has to 
believe that the loss of the law has done nothing but create a gap 
between Muslims and their God, that the category "Muslims" (and for 
that matter "God") has retained its internal coherence despite the 
loss. For there to be a longing for a reunion with the law lost there 
has to be a Muslim self yearning, an idealized supra historical self 
that defies the forces of history, that stays the same even though it 
had lost its law, that even though it is the law that defines what a 
Muslim is, the Muslim has managed to survive and supercede "his" 
foundational law .... 
Hallaq's narrative however quickly breaks down when Hallaq 
finds himself forced to contend with real Muslims, and when he does, 
he is unhappy with what he sees. The real Muslim, the Muslim-in-
the-world, turns out to be only a pale shadow of the idealized one that 
Hallaq warmly embraced in his imagination. In his account of the 
contemporary "Muslim discourses" on how to deal with the "predica-
ment" of loss-of-law-based alienation, here is how Hallaq describes 
the discourse that the majority of Muslims subscribe to according to 
his own admission: 
This camp, which represents the majority of ordinary Mus-
lims as well as the surviving but marginalized pockets of the 
educated, religio-legal class, has not shown adequate aware-
ness either of the structural and fundamental effects of mo-
dernity or of their own past. To the members of this camp, 
modernity is an indistinct phenomenon and their past is a 
myopically perceived image,justifying anything that the pre-
sent happens to offer. An index of their perceptions is their 
insistence on religion as a guide to life and an incoherent ac-
ceptance of modern ideas and institutions.24 
It is hard to ignore the unflattering terms with which Hallaq de-
scribes the "majority of ordinary Muslims." They lack "awareness," 
they have a "myopically perceived image" of their past, and suffer 
from an "incoherent acceptance of modern ideas." What is it that the 
majority of Muslims have done to earn Hallaq's profound disappoint-
ment and discontent? They refuse to be alienated from their present 
and refuse to long for an idealized past: they have "not shown ade-
24. Hallaq, supra note14, at 1716 (emphasis added). 
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quate awareness either of the structural and fundamental effects of 
modernity or of their own past." On the contrary, they have the ten-
dency to "[justify] anything that the present happens to offer." Given 
Hallaq's harshness on ordinary Muslims, one is left with the conclu-
sion that the real tragedy is not that of Muslim's alienation and long-
ing for their law, but of Hallaq's own romance with the idealized 
Muslim. Descend from the pedestal down to earth, and the loved one 
(the Muslim) turns out to be no more than a hybrid of things, a 
"freak" who rejects simple dichotomies and simply patches and col-
lages her various identities as she tries to survive her national post-
colonial reality. Ah! The aches of lost loves. 
Wael Hallaq is unusual in the fact that he recognizes the deep 
and interrupting influence the legal transplant has had in the Is-
lamic world. I will argue below that when it comes to Islamic law 
instruction in the classroom, most instructors tend to ignore the 
transplant altogether or to mention it only cursorily. However, Hal-
laq shares with the rest of the instructors a desire for a return of 
Muslim to law. 
RHETORICAL STRATEGIES DESIGNED TO PRODUCE THE FANTASY 
EFFECT IN COURSE DESCRIPTIONS AND SYLLABI RELATING 
TO ISLAMIC LAw 
In this section I discuss the syllabus/course descriptions of three 
Islamic law scholars: Frank Vogel of the Harvard Law School, Sher-
man Jackson of the University of Michigan and its law school, and 
Khaled Abou EI Fadl of the UCLA School of Law. I use their instruc-
tional literature, at least what I was able to get hold of, because of 
their status in the field as some of the most venerable scholars of 
Islamic law and because ofthe status ofthe law schools in which they 
teach. It is my belief that they have, because of these twin factors, 
inordinate influence on how the field is described and taught. 
In a course on Islamic law offered in the aftermath of September 
11 entitled, "Contemporary Islamic Legal Thought: Law, State, and 
World Order,"25 the syllabus begins in the first week with "an orien-
tation to the course" through introducing the students to "early Is-
lamic legal history covering the prophetic and early succeeding 
generations."26 The syllabus proceeds to trace Islamic law from this 
foundational era to the following one, namely that of the classical era 
(9-13 AD). In this part ofthe syllabus one is introduced to the mode of 
25. The instructor of this course is Frank Vogel of Harvard Law School. The 
course was most recently offered in Spring 2003. The Spring 2003 syllabus is availa-
ble at http://www .law .harvard.edU/faculty/vogel/courses/islamiclcourses/ (hereinafter 
''Vogel Syllabus"). 
26. Early Islamic legal history has its textual basis in "the quran and the sunna of 
the prophet." 
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legal scholarship characteristic of the schools of law of the classical 
period, as well as the main legal operators/ producers oflegal rules in 
these schools (muftis, jurists). The third week revolves around the 
law of "worldly authority" that centers the discussion around the no-
tion of the caliphate in medieval times. Discussion of worldly author-
ity takes the student to the Ottoman era (I6-20th century). We now 
come to the modern period marked by the transplantation of Euro-
pean Codes.27 But the syllabus pays scant attention to them. The 
week designed to discuss the transplant merely surveys the history of 
transplantation in the various parts of the Islamic world using 
Liebesny.28 Having "paid homage" in a polite and cursory way to the 
"Western styled" modern legal systems barely noting their occur-
rence, the syllabus marches forward to the "next thing" as if the 
"Western-styled" was a trifle and ordinary event: 
The dismantling of Islamic legal systems from 1800 onward 
in favor of new Western-styled systems. In most countries 
the jurisdiction of Islamic law and courts is reduced to the 
laws of the family. Emergence of other models for the Islamic 
constitution including that of the modern nation state based 
on popular sovereignty. Survey of now extant Islamic legal 
and constitutional models and of how Islamic law is now ap-
plied worldwide.29 
The paragraph above is making an odd claim to my mind. In the first 
half of the paragraph if informs the student that the Islamic legal 
system has been dismantled and that nothing of the medieval system 
has survived except the "laws of the family." However, in the second 
half, it proceeds to describe the emergence of "the Islamic constitu-
tion" that is based on "popular sovereignty." What is odd about this 
claim is that legal institutions such as "popular sovereignty" and the 
"constitution" are very modern concepts, the cultural products of the 
post-enlightenment liberal West. Their emergence in the Islamic 
world could only be attributed to the transplant and therefore attach-
27. The modern period is characterized by a) colonization of the Islamic world by 
France and Britain primarily; and b) modernization projects initiated by local elites to 
preempt colonial pressure but also following colonization. When it comes to law, this 
era is marked by the importation of legal transplants from Europe (beginning with 
the introduction of criminal, commercial and procedural codes, codification of certain 
Islamic rules on private law and ending with the introduction of national civil codes). 
So much so that the bulk of extant legal texts in the countries that have Islamic ma-
jorities today including the courts that administer those texts, distributed along mul-
tiple appellate levels and manned by secularly trained judges as the main operators of 
this system. Such imported legal institutions (texts, interpreters and operators) have 
seriously displaced the preceding legal system discussed in Vogel's syllabus thus far. 
28. HERBERT J. LIEBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE EAST: READINGS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS (1975). 
29. Vogel Syllabus, supra note 25, at Feb. 11,2003. Italics in the quote are mine, 
meant to highlight the places in which the ambiguity of the property "Islamic" is be-
ing made use of by the author of the text. 
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ing the word "Islamic" to them could only mean that the signification 
of the word "Islamic" has shifted from the first half of the paragraph 
to the second. In the first half, "Islamic" referred to law that is 
foundationally Islamic, i.e., derived from Islamic religious sources by 
Muslims trying earnestly to develop law that is attributable to texts 
that they treat as peculiar to them as Muslims. In the second half, 
the word 'Islamic" seems to now refer to a "law/constitution" adopted 
by Muslims from elsewhere as the textual foundations of this law 
seem to, as historical fact, lie elsewhere. In other words, what is Is-
lamic about law in the first instance is its textual source, and what is 
Islamic about law in the second instance is the identity of its import-
ers. Indeed, the last sentence of the paragraph "Survey of now extant 
Islamic legal and constitutional models and of how Islamic law is now 
applied worldwide" proceeds to use both meanings of the word "Is-
lamic" to indicate the latter meaning in the first usage (identity of the 
user of the legal text) and the former meaning in the second (identity 
of the text itselD. 
The slippage from one meaning to the other is very subtle and 
allows the author to treat the history of Islamic law as continuous 
with and the same as history of law in the Islamic countries. This in 
turn explains how "Islamic law" in this approach can be described as 
dead ("dismantled legal system") and not dead ("emergence of the Is-
lamic constitution") at the same time. It also allows the author to 
"smooth over" the radical interruption in the "identity of the legal 
text" that occurred as a result of the transplant. For having regis-
tered the occurrence of the transplant earlier on in the paragraph 
"The dismantling of Islamic legal systems from 1800 onward in favor 
of new Western- styled systems" in a "confessional" mode, the in-
structor proceeds to "deny" it through transferring the identity Is-
lamic from text to importer, therefore stripping the imported text 
from its threateningly "interrupting" quality. 
However, if one proceeds to read the second paragraph of the syl-
labus one notes that attributing the word "Islamic" to "constitution" 
in no way leads to a serious discussion of the transplant now called 
Islamic. One would think that describing the constitution as Islamic 
might encourage the instructor to discuss it in a mode of "embrace" 
now that it's dangerous imported quality had been tamed through 
appropriation. No such thing happens however. Witness the next 
thing that the instructor asks the students to do: 
Analyze: What is needed from an Islamic legal theory 
today, not only in respect to determining legal rules or out-
comes (usul al-fiqh)30 but also with respect to shaping the 
30. Usul al-fiqh: refers to the legal theory first innovated by the famous Muslim 
jurist Muhammad Ibn Idris al-ShMi'i in the ninth century. The era of Usul, which 
spanned the early centuries of Islam, was one in which the schools of law innovated 
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legal institutions and legal systems that uphold law gener-
ally, including importantly constitutional structures (usul al-
hukm)?31 What traits would a successful contemporary Is-
lamic legal theory have ?32 
On the contrary, the constitution is picked as "Islamic" only to be 
dropped in the next sentence in a complex act of disavowal. For it 
turns out that our next task for this constitution is to revert it back to 
the old sense of being "Islamic," i.e., to work at reconstructing it so 
that it loses its imported quality and becomes textually Islamic, not 
merely Islamic by virtue of being embraced by Muslims "shaping the 
legal institutions and legal systems that uphold law generally, in-
cluding importantly constitutional structures Cusul al-hukm)?" How 
do we do that? Well, through a skillful use of "usul al-fiqh," i.e., back 
to the textually Islamic. 
So if one were to map the rhetorical strategy of the syllabus that 
allows the instructor to ignore the transformative impact of the 
transplant on law in the Islamic world, one finds that it is based first 
on, embrace of the transplant by attributing to it the quality "Is-
lamic" only to disavow it by calling for "reconstructing" by what is 
truly "Islamic." 
The dizzying back and forth usage of the word "Islamic" in course 
descriptions is quite common. For instance, in a course description of 
an "Introduction to Islamic Law" seminar, the instructor33 writes: 
Islamic law is one of the oldest and most significant systems 
of law in the contemporary age. We will study the history, 
theory and the role Islamic law in the contemporary age ... 
The course will be divided into two main parts: the first will 
deal with Islamic law in the classical context while the sec-
ond will examine the role of Islamic law in the contemporary 
age. We will begin by considering the question of "Why study 
Islamic law?" We will then move on to the history and theory 
of the Islamic legal system with a special emphasis on the 
development ofthe various schools ofthought in Islamic law. 
In the second half of the course we will survey Islamic com-
mercial, criminal and family laws and their influence on the 
modern age. Furthermore, we will examine Islamic public in-
rules inspired directly by the sources of the religion, i.e. the Qur'an and Hadith. This 
was done through ijtihad, the religious and legal project of coming up with new rules 
of law directly inspired by the sources of the religion, or exerting one's effort to dis-
cover God's law on a particular matter 
31. Theory of Governance 
32. Vogel Syllabus, supra note 25, at Feb. 13, 2003 (emphasis added). 
33. The instructor of this course is Khaled Abou EI Fadl of the UCLA School of 
Law. The course offered at the UCLA School of Law is numbered Law 335, and its 
description is available at http://www.law.ucla.edulhome/index.asp?page=211 (herein-
after "EI Fadl Course Description"). 
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ternationallaw, human rights and Islamic law and the Mus-
lim minority in the United States.34 
803 
The course description above is another example of the way the 
double use of the word "Islamic" functions as a complex maneuver 
designed to DENY the transplant through a double act of appropria-
tion and rejection. The instructor uses the word "Islamic" to mean 
"textually Islamic" in "Islamic law in the classical context." However, 
the use of the word "Islamic" in the second paragraph is much more 
complex. What is interesting is attaching the word "Islamic" to "com-
mercial, criminal and family laws." Whereas Muslims produced a 
great deal of doctrine in those areas of the law, the division of the 
fields into "commercial, criminal, and family" was unknown to them. 
Muslims have come to know these divisions of doctrinal fields 
through the transplant. One effect of the use of the word "Islamic" 
then in this context is a projection back to the past in which medieval 
doctrine is now seen as divided into doctrinal fields similar to those of 
the modern transplant. To my mind the implicit idea in this kind of 
textual organization is to suggest, that medieval Islamic law is com-
parable to the modern transplant. Feeling compelled to re-present the 
Islamic law of medieval times in "transplant" terms attests to the 
power of the transplant. However, this power is quickly resisted by 
the instructor through relegating it to a modest place: it's already 
"corrupted" by the medieval Islamic, "their influence on the modern 
age." While it is true that the modern transplant in the Islamic world 
has incorporated some rules developed in medieval times, what is in-
teresting in this context is that the course description fits this indis-
putable "fact" into its identitarian project. To preserve the smooth 
unfolding of the identity "Islamic" of the law in the narrative of the 
text, the transplant becomes a thing to be "influenced" as the spirit of 
Islamic law marches forward transforming all things un-Islamic in 
its path. The structure of the text would look very different if the 
author chose to admit a discontinuity in the identity of the law as a 
result of the transplant, of the identity of Muslims as a result of 
colonialism/post-colonialism. In this case, the transplant is centered 
as the "new age" oflaw, heralding a new dawn of complex identity, in 
which "Islamic" is only one of them. The "center" and the "periphery" 
of the text, is in this case reversed. 
Another way of making the same point: the discursive strategy of 
the course description seems to be: rather than recognize the legal 
transplant for what it was as an "interruption" in legal text, institu-
tion, discourse, and interpretation, initiating a radically new coioniall 
post-colonial legal history, it is instead treated as an occurrence to 
Islamic law within an overall movement of the unfolding of Islamic 
34. EI Fadl Course Description, supra note 33. Italics are mine designed to point 
out the place where I believe the "rhetorical" slippage takes place. 
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history. That is the "Islamic legal" is not displaced by the transplant, 
it merely changes into "it" for the moment, doomed to feel uncomfort-
able in this new and unnatural incarnation which is why it (the Is-
lamic legal) is bound to shed it (the transplant), after adopting some 
of its features, and return to its originary self. 
In another course description the instructor35 presents his course 
in the following way: 
This course will introduce students to classical Islamic legal 
theory and some applications of positive law in the Sunni 
tradition. Mter a brief review of the seminal controversies 
that defined the "formative period," and the development of 
Islamic legal theory, we will examine the interpretive modus 
operandi of the full-blown schools of law in the "post-forma-
tive" era. This will include an examination of such key issues 
as ijtihad versus taqlid, the madhhab (or school oflaw), the 
legal res pons urn (fatwa), legal [eclecticism], and the issue of 
legal change, stasis and borrowing. This will be carried out 
via a general overview of a number of areas of positive law, 
e.g., marriage, divorce, abortion, child custody and legal pro-
cedure. The course will conclude with a look at developments 
in Islamic legal thinking in modern times, including an ex-
amination of some legal responsa (in translation) to some 
important modern controversies and a few samples of juris-
prudential writings of Muslim scholars in the East and 
West. 
The description above doesn't even attempt to refer to the transplant 
either directly or metonymically. Once the students have finished ex-
ploring the medieval era, including exploring such legal institutions 
and practices as Ijtihad, taqlid, madhhab, Fatwa (all features of the 
classical era), they are invited to "look at developments in Islamic 
legal thinking in modern times, including an examination of some le-
gal responsa .... " Legal Responsa (Fatwa) is a reference to legal opin-
ions issued by religious figures in the context of private legal 
consultation, in which the "Mufti" is asked for his legal opinion on a 
hypothetical matter posed by a questioner. Ifta' was a form of legal 
practice that was central in the medieval era. The practice of "Ifta" 
(to issue Fatwa) exists today on the margins of the official legal sys-
tem and represents, in my view, an instance of the way religious law 
has been to a large extent "privatized" since the advent of the legal 
transplant. While Ifta in the classical era lived in a collaborative and 
35. Sherman A. Jackson, Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies, the 
University of Michigan, and Adjunct Professor of Law, the University of Michigan 
Law School. The course described is offered at the University of Michigan Law School 
as Islamic Law. The course description is available at http://cgi2.www.law. 
umich.eduCClassScheduleiaboutCourse.asp?crse_id=038904. 
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harmonious way with other forms of legal practice especially adjudi-
cation, it has lost its central place in the modern era as adjudication 
acquired a state-based and code-based quality. As a result, the mufti 
has been transformed into a private legal consultant to a multitude of 
religiously driven advice seekers. The description above explores the 
(textually) "Islamic" in the medieval period, and pursues it in contem-
porary times through concentrating on one of its surviving practices. 
Thus continuity of the Islamic is preserved, albeit through the pur-
suit of a trail that becomes thinner and thinner as we approach mod-
ern times. The course doesn't seem to explore the causes for the 
progressively disappearing trail nor even attempt to recast Ifta, not 
as continuous practice ofIslamic law, as it seems to do, but rather as 
a transformed practice that lives dialectically at the margins of a new 
legal system.36 
36. While one organizer of a course entitled Islam and the Rule of Law offered by 
Stanford University recently explains that offering the course came as "a response to 
students and faculty groups who strongly desired a better understanding of the rule of 
law in Islamic societies in the aftermath of Sept. 11," another explains the problem in 
the following manner, "we know precious little about legal traditions in Islam." Lisa 
Trei, New Course to Teach 'Authoritative'-Not Authoritarian-Interpretation of Is-
lam, STAN. REC., Jan. 8, 2003, at http://news-service.stanford.edulnews/2003/janu-
ary8/islam-18.html (quoting Eric Jensen and Coit Blacker) (emphasis added). The 
confusion of the organizers of the course for whom understanding "the rule of law in 
Islamic societies" is the same as getting to know the "legal traditions in Islam" only 
points to the depth of the problem. When the former insists that "the interpretation of 
the Koran is the most important issue among the faithful .... [e]verything else flows 
from this," it becomes clear that in the organizers' minds what makes a society Is-
lamic is its "faithful," and that it is their law "flowing from the Koran" that constitutes 
"the rule oflaw in Islamic societies" that we need to "understand." Id. (quoting Eric 
Jensen) (emphasis added). The course is structured in the following manner. It be-
gins with a lecture entitled "Introduction to Islam and Islamic Law: The Historical 
Development of Islamic Law" (offered by a historian), moves on to a lecture on "Gen-
der and Islamic Law" (offered by a historian), third, a lecture entitled "Interpretation 
and Authority in Islamic Law" (offered by a historian), followed by "Islam and the 
Rules of War" (offered by a law professor), comes back to gender again "Women's 
Rights, Religion and the State in Islam: Muslim Women's Civil Society Organizations 
and Policy Advocacy" (offered by a law professor), followed by "Rule of Law: Practi-
tioners' Session (offered by development specialists) and ends with a lecture on "Eco-
nomic Development and Islamic Law" (offered by an economist). While historians are 
asked to speak of history, development specialists of "programs promoting rule oflaw 
in the Arab world, economists of "classic economic concepts in Islamic jurisprudence," 
the lawyers are asked to talk of gender and war under Islamic law. Id. 
In a nutshell, according to this course, Islamic law is a historic religious text used 
to oppress women, wage war on the West, but is hopefully open to reform through new 
forms of "interpretation and authority," "civil society advocacy," rule oflaw programs 
by development agencies, and last but not least, modernization of its economic and 
fmancial policies. In other words, rule of law reform projects are represented as a 
"gift" offered to those with a hang up on some olden religious text with its olden pre-
modern rules. There is no modern state law in place that mediates between the two, 
no modern legislated law, no modern court, no code, no internationally signed trea-
ties, no constitutions, nothing, only the faithful and their text. In order to appreciate 
the nature of this fantasized object called "Islamic law" and offered us to understand 
in the wake of September 11, let us imagine what a course on "Islamic law" would look 
like if the contemporary hybridity of Islamic law were taken into account. I imagine 
that a course like that would begin with "The Historical Development of Islamic Law" 
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In this section I have attempted to describe the strategies pur-
sued by Islamic law scholars in their pedagogy on Islamic law. I have 
identified two such strategies: first, the instructor starts the course 
with medieval law, and once history takes the students to the modern 
legal transplant, the instructors doesn't spend much time on it, 
rather, in an act that wishes the transplant away, he proceeds by 
inviting the students to reconstruct the transplant, ie, see it through 
medieval Islamic eyes. The project of reconstruction the students are 
invited to engage into has of course strong liberal undertones. In the 
second strategy the instructor starts with medieval law and when he 
deals with the contemporary period he pursues a thin trail of Islamic 
law that has survived in modern times (such as Ifta, or family law, or 
Islamic rules on contract) while ignoring the contemporary law in 
which these Islamic legal practices have become a part of. This pro-
duces the effect that Islamic law has continued its path from the me-
dieval to the modern, everywhere ... 
ISLAMIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP IN THE US 
Islamic law scholars in the US are for the most part of a liberal 
conviction. What the Muslim and non-Muslim among them have in 
common is the project of dispelling stereotypes about Islam and Is-
lamic law in the US, especially among non-Muslims. Those among 
them who are Muslim37 acquire their identity as "liberal Muslim" 
through an act of triple differentiation: first from the conservative 
religious Muslim (whether of the traditionalist or fundamentalist 
stripe), second, from the secular Muslim, and third from the "orien-
talist" non-Muslim scholar. When it comes to the religious they are 
liberal (with whom they share the belief that religion is a founda-
tional category for Muslim culture), and when it comes to the secular 
they are religious (with whom they may share liberalism as a com-
followed by a lecture on "Colonization, Modernization and Law in the Islamic World," 
followed by "A History of Codification in the Islamic World," moving on to three ses-
sions that discuss positive rules in the Islamic world "Comparative Discussion of 
Rules of property (tort, rape, corporation, tax, social security, emergency) in Indone-
sia, Pakistan, and Egypt." This would then lead us to a discussion of "Emergent Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence in the Islamic World: Comparing the constitutional 
decisions of Pakistan, Kuwait and Egypt," moving on to "Discussion of Adjudication in 
the Islamic World: Relationship between Lower Courts and Higher Courts," followed 
by "Legislation and Legislative Processes: Relationship between Executive and Legis-
lative in the Islamic World," followed by, "Legislating the Family in the Islamic 
World: Secular Feminism or Reformed Islamicism" ... Once we introduce into the pic-
ture the intermediation between the "Muslim" and his religious text of the modern 
state in the Islamic world, identify its laws as primarily modern national products, as 
opposed to Islamic, the modern nation understood as a complex product of a history of 
European colonization and modernization by national(ist) elites, then the picture is 
instantly transformed. The solipsistic relationship between the Muslim and his text 
that the identitarian project assumes is broken ... 
37. Khaled Abou EI Fadl and Aziza al-Hibri, Professor of Law at the T.C. Wil-
liams School of Law at the University of Richmond, are classic examples. 
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mon faith), and when it comes to the orientalist scholar they are crit-
ics (with whom they share the belief that Islamic law is a 
foundational category for Muslim culture). 
When it comes to the first, they pursue the tactic in their writ-
ings of "liberalizing" the believers by freeing them from the "misinter-
pretation" ofthe conservative or fundamentalist voices. Whether they 
are addressing an American Muslim religious student body, supervis-
ing the scholarly work of graduate students from the Islamic world, 
engaging themselves with the affairs of the immigrant Muslim com-
munity, or addressing a non-Muslim American audience, liberal 
scholars of Islamic law, see themselves (and are for the most part38 
seen) as paragons of reasoned study and elaboration in a world full of 
religious fraudulence, passive receptivity to inherited misinterpreta-
tions, and unabashed bias. Some of those scholars have attracted the 
limelight in the aftermath of September 11, seen by the liberal media 
as the voices of "moderation" in the Muslim community, those that 
assure us that "Muslims" are not really very different from us (if only 
they understood their religion right!). 
When it comes to the second, the secular Muslim, the liberal 
Muslim Islamic law scholar, is for the most part dismissive. Hislher 
dismissiveness of the secular Muslim is quick, impatient, and confi-
dent, assuring their Muslim and non-Muslim audiences that secular-
ism in the Islamic world is an import ideology from the West that has 
been tried and failed and has therefore been illegitimate. The rise of 
the religious movements in the Islamic world since the mid-seventies 
of the twentieth century is typically given as a sign of the ultimate 
unacceptability of secularism among "Muslims" as ideology.39 
38. Campus Watch is an example of an organization that is critical of these liberal 
scholars. According to their Web site, Campus Watch is an organization that "reviews 
and critiques Middle East studies in North America with an aim to improving them." 
See Campus Watch at http://www.campus-watch.org!. 
39. El Fadl, supra note 4, at 93-94: 
To propose secularism as a solution, to avoid the hegemony of Shari'ah 
and the possibility of an abuse of power is, in my view, unacceptable. There 
are several reasons for this. First, given the rhetorical choice between alle-
giance to the Shari'ah and allegiance to Constitutionalism, most Muslims 
will make the understandable, equally rhetorical, decision to ally themselves 
to the Shari'ah. Secondly, secularism has become an unworkable and un-
helpful symbolic construct. In the Muslim world, secularism has been nor-
mally associated with what is described as the Western intellectual invasion, 
both in the period of Colonialism and post-Colonialism. Furthermore, secu-
larism has come to symbolize a misguided belief in the probity of rationalism 
and a sense of hostility to religion as a source of guidance in the public 
sphere. 
The third consideration remembers the earlier point that, beyond the 
issue of symbolism, there is a considerable variation in the practice of secu-
larism. It is entirely unclear to what extent the practice of secularism re-
quires a separation of church and state, especially in light of the fact that 
there is no institutional church in Islam. Put differently, to what extent does 
the practice of secularism mandate the exclusion of religion from the public 
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When it comes to the orientalist, the liberal Muslim, is a critic at 
large, outraged at the misrepresentations of Islamic law by the orien-
talist scholar, charging the latter with giving Islamic law short shrift, 
begrudging it its richness, ingenuity, capacity to evolve, and autono-
mous contributions to legality. In short, the liberal Islamic law 
scholar is a critic of the orientalist's non-recognition of Muslim legal 
genius.40 
But it is very lonely to be a liberal Muslim Islamic law scholar. 
Haunted by the formalism of the conservative believer flaunting the 
text in his face, accusing him of giving God's word short shrift 
through misinterpretation, taunted by the secular Muslim's invita-
tion to quit all this religious talk and simply "come out" as a run-of-
the-mill Western liberal, nervous about the secular historiography of 
Islamic law that charges Muslims of projecting back unto the prophet 
traditions they themselves invented, the liberal Muslim Islamic law 
scholar is in a real bind. Caught between being an anti-formalist in 
relation to the first, and a formalist in relation to the second and 
third, the liberal Muslim Islamic law scholar is involved in a strict 
balancing act that threatens to push him to one side or the other. 
LIBERAL ISLAMIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP: A TRICKY BALANCING ACT 
Unless the conception of government is founded around core 
moral values about the normative purpose of Shari'ah, and 
unless there is a process that limits the ability of the govern-
ment to violate those core moral values, the idea of a govern-
ment bound by Shari'ah remains hopelessly vague. It is 
quite possible for a government to faithfully implement the 
main technical rules of Shari'ah, but otherwise flout the rule 
of law. In fact, implementation of the technicalities of 
Shari'ah can be used as an excuse for allotting the govern-
ment unrestrained legislative and executive powers. For in-
stance, in order to guard modesty, the government could 
issue arbitrary laws forbidding many forms of public assem-
bly; under the guise of protection of orthodoxy, the govern-
domain, including the exclusion of religion as a source oflaw? Finally, to the 
extent that the secular paradigm relies on a belief in the guidance-value of 
reason as a means for achieving utilitarian fulfillment or justice, it is 
founded on a conviction that is not empirically or morally verifiable. One 
could plausibly believe that religion is an equally valid means of knowing or 
discovering the means to happiness or justice. 
The fact that secularism is a word laden with unhelpful connotations in 
the Islamic context should not blind us to the fact that the discourse of 
Shari'ah enables human beings to speak in God's name, and effectively em-
powers human agency with the voice of God. 
40. HaIlaq, supra note 14, at 1707 ("[Ajt the heart of Muslim politics and political 
theory, and at the basis of their conduct and conception, there lies a significant de-
posit, if not a rich substrate, of law"). 
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ment could pass arbitrary laws punishing creative 
expression; under the guise of protection of individuals from 
slander, the government could punish many forms of politi-
cal and social criticism; and a government could imprison or 
execute political dissenters under the claim that they are 
sowing fitnah (discord and social turmoil). Arguably, all such 
governmental actions are Shari'ah-compliant unless there is 
a clear sense about the limits imposed upon the ability of the 
government to service even the Shari'ah. Put differently, the 
rules of law cannot be used as an excuse to flout the rule of 
law, and the state cannot be allowed to usurp the process by 
which Shari'ah law is determined.41 
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The author of the above quote is engaged in an "Islamic law" recon-
structive project. His declared purpose is to mine "Sunni legal 
thought" for constitutional potentia1.42 In order to do that, the author 
reads medieval political and jurisprudential literature discussing 
"justice," "the contract of the Caliphate," "Shura" (government by con-
sultation), "huquq Allah" (rights of God), and "huquq al-ibad" (rights 
of people), etc. The question for him seems to be: if we dug the Islamic 
medieval politico/legal mine ardently and discriminatorily enough, 
will we find a liberal constitution with rights, democracy, and all, 
waiting to be "undug"? The answer in the end is of course yes, (other-
wise why do it) but with a proviso: doctrinal potential for constitu-
tionalism is one thing, political culture is another, 
As noted earlier, constitutional practice appropriates the 
values and intellectual heritage that prevails within a soci-
ety. Although sparks of constitutional thought were defi-
nitely generated in the Islamic intellectual heritage, it would 
be an exaggeration to claim that constitutional values or 
normative orientations are a consistent part of this tradi-
tion. But it is these sparks that can be co-opted in the con-
temporary age, and developed into full-fledged constitutional 
visions with potential to contribute to constitutional 
practices.43 
Well, who could disagree with that? Constitutionalism is good in 
modern times. To ensure that it sticks in a particular society, ac-
41. EI Fadl, supra note 4, at 74. 
42. Id. at 68: 
Therefore, this essay will focus on potentialities-i.e., the doctrinal aspects 
in Sunni political thought that could legitimate, promote, or subvert the 
emergence of a constitutional practice in Muslim cultures. These doctrinal 
potentialities exist in a dormant state until they are co-opted and directed by 
systematic thought supported by cumulative social practices. This essay con-
cerns itself with doctrinal potentialities or concepts constructed by the inter-
pretive activity of Muslim scholars (primarily jurists), but will not focus on 
the socio-political practices in Islamic history. 
43. Id. at 92-93. 
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cepted by its masses as an organizing political ideal, it's best if this 
idea could be projected back onto this society's historic texts.44 So 
why not dig hard and deep into the medieval Islamic politico/legal 
texts and interpret constitutionalism whenever they give you the 
slightest hint? 
Well, the problem is twofold. First, the particular "texts" that the 
author chooses to do the digging into are all pre-modern Islamic: 
This essay concerns itself with doctrinal potentialities or 
concepts constructed by the interpretive activity of Muslim 
scholars (primarily jurists), but will not focus on the socio-
political practices in Islamic history.45 
Of all those "Muslim jurists," or shall we say "dead brown men," 
whose work the author mines for constitutional "doctrinal potentiali-
ties," the youngest died circa the fourteenth century!46 It is obvious 
that for the author, "Islamic" is a peculiarity of a particular culture, 
and it derives this identity from texts written sometime before the 
fourteenth century. 
To my mind, this begs the question: what about contemporary 
texts produced by contemporary Muslims on constitutional jurispru-
dence? What about the decisions by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court of Egypt? What about the modern treatises on constitutional 
jurisprudence that are taught in law schools all across the Islamic 
world? What about all these dissertations being written by graduate 
law students in the Islamic world reading European and America ju-
risprudence on constitutionalism and trying to develop a modern lo-
cal version of constitutionalism in their own local cultures? What 
about all these types of legal reasoning developed by contemporary 
constitutional courts in the Islamic world in which they are address-
ing contemporary problems of constitutionalism? Do they all count 
for nothing? What is the meaning of a reconstructive act that pushes 
all these doctrines and texts aside and instead goes further back in 
time in search for Islamic constitutionalism? How are we to under-
stand this search for the "origins"?47 
44. The author begins by voicing the following cautionary note about his project: 
It is doubtful whether it is helpful to abstract the doctrines of constitutional-
ism from their remarkably diverse cultural and social contexts. Constitution-
alism reflects embedded normative values that arise from evolved historical 
practices that are not easily transplanted outside their natural habitat. In 
many ways, constitutionalism must be practiced and not theorized. There-
fore, one cannot help but worry that speaking of constitutionalism in Sunni 
Islamic thought is not only an anachronism, but also an abstraction that ulti-
mately will yield limited insight. 
[d. at 67. 
45. [d. at 68 (emphasis added). 
46. See footnotes of his article. 
47. The author could respond to these questions by asserting that he's simply not 
interested in these contemporary texts but in "Sunni legacy" as the title of his article 
reveals. Yes, but that only begs the question: why the "Sunni legacy"?? why "legacy"? 
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It seems to me that the author's reconstructive project here 
mimics the approach of the Islamic law instructor above. It assumes 
away contemporary law, jurisprudence, and legal reasoning. In other 
words, it assumes away the transplant (for all contemporary consti-
tutions in the Islamic world are transplants). Why? I can only guess 
that the author doesn't think that these legal phenomena meet the 
"Islamicity test." For they are all based, aren't they, the jurispru-
dence, the doctrine, the mode of reasoning, on a transplanted text, 
one that cannot be seen as "organic" and therefore any legal infra-
structure built on it, cannot be taken seriously. It's foreignness 
doesn't cease, the rationale seems to go, even if contemporary Mus-
lims worked around it, on it, from it, towards it, etc. 
All this leaves the impression with the uninformed reader that it 
is only when we look into the medieval that we can find the authenti-
cally Islamic and therefore the only (potentially) legitimate constitu-
tion in the Islamic world must be one derived from that era. For if the 
Islamic world has proven to be thus far "unconstitutionally" oriented, 
dictatorial, authoritarian, undemocratic, at least a big part ofthe rea-
son must be that whatever constitutional legal infrastructure it does 
have is not Islamic. And therefore, the author's earnest reconstruc-
t · . t 48 lve prOJec ... 
What makes our author a liberal Muslim Islamic law scholar is 
that his piece, as typified by the quote that at the beginning of this 
section, concerns itself with the religious Muslim who advocates a 
Sharia based constitution and offers in response a "core-values-
above-the-Sharia" based constitution: 
Unless the conception of governance is founded around core 
moral values about the normative purpose of Shari'ah, and 
unless there is a process that limits the ability of the govern-
ment to violate those core moral values, the idea of a govern-
ment bound by Shari'ah remains hopelessly vague.49 
His core values are identifiably liberal (individual rights, democracy, 
etc), the outcome of his mining-the- medieval- texts activity. His tex-
tual anti-formalism in which he refers the Muslim to "the normative 
purpose of Sharia" instead of its positive laws is typical of the liberal 
48. The type of implicit reasoning (implicit in the reconstructive project) doesn't 
seem plausible to me. The appeal to "Islamicity" is typically presented as the request 
of the "masses." However, lack of constitutionality is never due to the rejection by the 
"masses" of foreign ideas implanted in their constitutions, such as individual rights, 
separation of powers, etc, because these doctrines obviously work for their benefit, at 
least on their face, but because the ruling elites refuse to make those constitutions 
meaningful for the masses. It is very doubtful to me, given the contemporary struc-
ture of the ruling classes in the Islamic world, that even if we come up with a more 
"authentically" Islamic constitution, that we will somehow be that much closer to ex-
tracting democracy from those elites. 
49. El Fadl, supra note 4, at 74; see supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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religious argumentative strategy in the face of religious conservative 
formalism. 
What makes our author a religious liberal Muslim Islamic law 
scholar is his dismissal of the legal activity (jurisprudence, doctrine, 
legislation) associated with the modern non-religious Muslim state. 
To recognize these legal phenomena would force the author to recog-
nize the complexity of contemporary hybrid identity of Muslims that 
includes the secular and the religious and a whole spectrum in be-
tween. To recognize the hybridity would locate his reconstructive pro-
ject in a particular ideological domain: a debate among a particular 
category of Muslims, namely, the religious ones. To recognize the ide-
ologicallocation of his project would turn his project from a legal con-
stitutional reconstructive project to a religious constitutional 
reconstructive project. 
This brings me to the second problem I have with the author's 
liberal religious reconstructive project, which represents the larger 
dilemma of those subscribing to it, namely the circular way in which 
he first dismisses secularism in the Islamic world as "unacceptable" 
only to return to it through re-interpretation of religious texts. Hav-
ing dismissed secularism in the Islamic world in this manner: 
To propose secularism as a solution, to avoid the hegemony 
of Shari'ah and the possibility of an abuse of power is, in my 
view, unacceptable. There are several reasons for this. First, 
given the rhetorical choice between allegiance to the 
Shari'ah and allegiance to Constitutionalism, most Muslims 
will make the understandable, equally rhetorical, decision to 
ally themselves to the Shari'ah. Secondly, secularism has be-
come an unworkable and unhelpful symbolic construct. In 
the Muslim world, secularism has been normally associated 
with what is described as the Western intellectual invasion, 
both in the period of Colonialism and post-Colonialism. Fur-
thermore, secularism has come to symbolize a misguided be-
lief in the probity of rationalism and a sense of hostility to 
religion as a source of guidance in the public sphere. 50 
The author ends his article with the following assertion: 
All laws articulated and applied in a state are thoroughly 
human, and should be treated as such. Consequently, any 
codification of Shari'ah law produces a set of laws that are 
thoroughly and fundamentally human. These laws are a 
part ofShari'ah law only to the extent that any set of human 
legal opinions is arguably a part of Shari'ah. A code, even if 
inspired by Shari'ah, is not Shari'ah-a code is simply a set 
of positive commandments that were informed by an ideal 
50. [d. at 93-94. 
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but do not represent the ideal. In my view, human legisla-
tion or codifications, regardless of their basis or quality, can 
never represent the Divine ideal. As to the fundamental 
rights that often act as the foundation of a constitutional 
system, a Muslim society must explore the basic values at 
the very core of the Divine Ideal. It would seem to me that 
the five juristic core values of protection for religion, life, in-
tellect, honor, and property are a good starting point.51 
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And so it goes with most scholarship on Islamic law in US legal 
academia. In a patterned argument that repeats the Islamic law 
course syllabus, the scholar makes an elaborate effort to study the 
historic medieval text as the source of the truly Islamic, eliding over 
or cursorily dismissing the contemporary legal as inauthentic or tran-
sitory, only to bring us back to the contemporary through the back-
door by arguing that Islamic law can only be human! If this were only 
one ofthe ways in which Islamic law scholarship is represented in the 
US, this particular approach would be an interesting one. But the 
fact that, as I argue in this article, it dominates the scholarship and 
in this departs to a great extent from the dominant legal scholarship 
in the Islamic world itself is indeed what makes this phenomenon 
worthy of commentary and to secular Muslims like myself a source of 
alarm! 
MUSLIM LAW VS. LAW OF MUSLIM COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
In this section I will argue that a desire parallel to that of Islamic 
law scholars to relegate the legal transplant of the Islamic world to a 
theoretical black hole also exists on the part of Western legal com-
paratists. I will take as example the writings on Islamic law of two 
comparatists: the French legal comparatist, Rene David, and the Ital-
ian comparatist Ugo Mattei. I choose David for his status as one of 
the most influential theorists of the idea of "legal families" in both the 
continent and the US. I choose Mattei because he belongs to a new, 
critical, and increasingly influential school of comparative law, the 
Sacco school of comparative law.52 In my discussion of both David 
51. [d. at 101. 
52. In a commentary entitled One Hundred Years of Comparative Law, Rodolfo 
Sacco, the originator of the school, explains his insights on comparative law in the 
following way: 
[WJe have contrasted legal definitions, legal and doctoral declamations, and 
rules declared by the courts, with those rules effectively applied by the 
courts. We have also discovered that the circulation oflaw is more the circu-
lation of diverse formants than the circulation of existing and working rules 
devoid of any contradiction within the system studied. The formants are dis-
associated. Here, comparative analysis offers the key to a better understand-
ing of each of the national laws. Comparative law enables us to realize that a 
single written rule will have multiple applications. This multiplicity means 
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and Mattei, I explore their respective attempts to find a legal family 
to adopt that "very different law" that typifies Muslims.53 
Grouping legal systems in legal families, on the basis of some 
perceived commonality, is an old preoccupation of comparative legal 
literature in the West that has been critiqued and rejected by some 
while reconstructed on different grounds by others after taking the 
critique into account. 
Rene David 
In his attempt to find a legal family for the law of Muslims, Rene 
David confronts the historical difficulty generated by European colo-
nization in the Islamic world in which "Muslim Law" (Islamic law) is 
not only altogether different from "Law in the Muslim countries" (le-
gal transplant), but the latter clearly belongs to Western law (Ro-
mano-Germanic or Common law). More specifically, for David, the 
difficulty is how to eject the laws associated with Muslims from the 
Western family oflaws, on the basis of Muslims' unbridgeable (philo-
sophical ?) difference when their positive laws are in fact Western. In 
the course of relegating Muslims' law to the family of "other systems," 
David ends up not so much ignoring the legal transplant, as Islamic 
law scholars have a tendency to do, but speaking of the transplant as 
ifit's an orphan child with special travails in the Islamic world differ-
ent from those it experienced in other places (such as say Latin 
America). While David imagines the legal transplant in Latin 
America to have been adopted by jurists who have embraced and pro-
tected it from the alien society it traveled to, David doesn't seem to 
have a similar faith in the fate of the transplant in the Islamic world. 
The latter is imagined by him as having arrived in the Islamic world 
only to receive a hostile reception by Muslim jurists. Alone without 
protectors or believers among the Islamic jurist class, it finds itself 
that a non-written element exists between the legal source and its interpre-
tation, or it proves that a written rule does not have the force that would be 
necessary to replace an old customary rule. Law cannot be reduced to a writ-
ten formula. Unwritten elements exist between the written formula and the 
law-fragments of old customs, that playa role in the mentalities of jurists; 
information that is communicated verbally at school and is, perhaps, wholly 
unverified; attitudes rooted in religious or secular ethics; latent notions in 
the culture of the interpreter. In sum, a whole world of elements exist that 
playa role in the law and about which we speak with respect to the means of 
legal interpretation. Comparative analysis has revealed them and has 
thereby unveiled the unwritten elements of the law, the "cryptotypes." 
75 TuL. L. REV. 1159, 1169 (2001). 
53. One that is different from Western Law, which for David includes the Ro-
mano-Germanic Law, the Common law, and Socialist Law. "In the [Romano-Ger-
manic family and the Common Law family], the law has undergone the influence of 
Christian morality and, since the Renaissance, philosophical teachings have given 
prominence to individualism, liberalism and personal rights. Henceforth, at least for 
certain purposes, this reconciliation enables us to speak of one great family of western 
law." DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 8, at 25. 
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orphaned and embattled. Curiously, ignoring the jurist class identi-
fied with the transplant in the Islamic world has a similar effect to 
that of ignoring the transplant itself. The effect is the production of 
the transplant as always-about-to-be-Islamicized, indeed that it will 
surely have to be Islamicized. 54 
At first blush, what David calls "Muslim law" is easily distin-
guishable from "Western law" according to the very criteria that 
David sets out at the beginning of his book for classifying law into 
legal families. To determine according to David whether two laws be-
long to the same family, two considerations have to be taken into ac-
count. The first, the easy "translatability" of a law belonging to one 
legal culture to a student of law of another legal culture, and second, 
the similarity (or difference) of the underlying "philosophical, politi-
calor economic principles" of these two respective legal cultures. For 
David, these two criteria "must be used cumulatively, not 
separately."55 
Muslim law clearly does not qualify for entry into the union of 
Western law according to the above criteria. It is neither easily trans-
latable to a student of common law or civil law and due to its nature 
as religious law it is relegated by David to a different philosophical 
regime from that of the Western legal family. 
The fundamental principle of Islam is that of an essentially 
theocratic society, in which the state is only of value as the 
servant of revealed religion. Instead of simply proclaiming 
moral principles or articles of dogma to which Muslim com-
munities would have to make their laws conform, Muslim 
jurists and theologians have built up a complete and detailed 
law on the basis of divine revelation-the law of an ideal so-
ciety which one day will be established in a world entirely 
subject to Islamic religion. 56 
By contrast, according to David, Western law has been influenced by 
"Christian morality and, since the Renaissance, philosophical teach-
ings [that] have given prominence to individualism, liberalism and 
personal rights."57 In other words, while Muslim law is foundation-
ally religious, relying on holy sources for its articulation, Western law 
has never been religious per se, though historically influenced by 
Christian morality. Moreover, in its more recent past Western law 
has become philosophically liberal. The reference to the Renaissance, 
to my mind, is designed to assert Western law's essentially secular 
nature. 
54. [d. at 482. 
55. [d. at 21. 
56. [d. at 455-56. 
57. [d. at 25; see supra note 53. 
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While Muslim law, as religious law cannot claim membership in 
a Western legal family, this is not easily the case with the contempo-
rary positive laws of Muslim countries. For after all, these are noth-
ing but transplants of Western laws. 
By dividing his discussion of the topic into two sections: Muslim 
law and law of Muslim countries, and by ensuring not to collapse the 
one into the other or to treat the latter cursorily, in the way Islamic 
law instructors do, David seems to pay homage to the legal trans-
plant in a serious way. Indeed, he is attentive to the ways in which 
the arrival of the legal transplant has complicated significantly the 
legal scene in Muslim countries. Not only has Muslim law been aban-
doned as governing law in fields such as contract, property, tort, 
crime, etc, but the one field that has retained Muslim law, personal 
status, has undergone codification in a great number of countries to 
the effect of transforming its very legal nature. Moreover, David is 
perfectly aware that courts associated with religious law have either 
been abolished through merger with non-religious courts or trans-
formed by being forced to adjudicate on the basis of a code.58 
For David, interestingly, religious law should be distinguished 
from the positive laws of Muslim countries even before the advent of 
the legal transplant. Not only is Muslim law as described in the 
above quote hardly present in the contemporary Islamic world as gov-
erning law,59 in fact, it has historically, and even before the advent of 
the transplant, always accommodated laws that were outside of its 
purview. This, Muslim law achieved through being conceptually open 
to customary practices, administrative legislation by the rulers, the 
creation of an infinite number of contractual arrangements due to its 
openness to the principle of "freedom of contract," and the use oflegal 
stratagems and fictions by Muslim jurists to avoid the strictness of 
religious law.60 In fact it is precisely because of this conceptual ac-
commodation of secular law that it had historically been possible for 
Muslim rulers to rationalize transplanting codes from Europe.61 In 
other words, David suggests that there has always existed a chasm in 
the Islamic world between religious law as ideal law (sometimes he 
likens it to natural law) and applied law as positive law. This duality 
has always been an integral part of the system. 
58. Id. at 475-81. 
59. David states: 
From Morocco to Indonesia, from the Soviet Socialist Republics of Cen-
tral Asia and from Albania to Zanzibar and Guinea, over 500 million Mus-
lims make up the majority of the population in some thirty countries, and 
they constitute large minorities in others. None of these countries is exclu-
sively governed by Muslim law. Although its authority is proclaimed in prin-
ciple, custom and legislation have everywhere added to or derogated from it. 
Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
60. Id. at 466-72. 
61. Id. at 475. 
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However, the integral secularity of law otherwise conceived as 
religious does not lead David to understand Muslim law according to 
this inherent complexity. By insisting on the religious nature of Mus-
lim law as the above quote reveals, David seems to treat the religious 
aspect of law as having a larger normative power than the secular 
aspect. For after all when he searches to find a quality to attribute to 
Muslim law, the one he adopts is that of "religious." David appears 
thus to treat religious law as a form of "natural law" that supercedes 
in its normative power secular (customary or administrative) regula-
tion that take place under its purview. This view he attributes to 
Muslims: 
In Muslim countries ... more attention is given to the model 
law linked to the Islamic religion than to local custom 
(treated as a phenomenon of fact) or the laws and decrees of 
the sovereign (treated as merely administrative measures) 
and neither of these is thought to possess the full dignity of 
law.62 
Indeed, when trying to explain to his Western readers the nature of 
Muslim law David evokes the parallel to the idea of "natural law" in 
Western thought as a way of making it familiar to them.63 
So when we ask ourselves, why does not David welcome the laws 
of Muslim countries as "foster children" of Western law? The answer 
is his belief that while Muslim law as religious law might not be in 
the books, in the courts, in the classroom, it's over there above every-
body's head speaking natural law to positive law. And since no Mus-
lim law speaks above the head of Westerners, Muslims could not be 
treated as foster children. At best, they can be seen as distant cous-
ins, for after all, we Westerners, are familiar with the idea of natural 
law and some of us do still indeed advocate it. 
To treat laws of Muslim countries as part of the family of West-
ern law would undermine a basic premise of David's comparative 
methodology and its sociological assumptions. For David, law has a 
double quality: it both stems from society, including its peculiar eco-
nomic, social and political circumstances, and at the same time ex-
presses this society's ideals. Laws might be substantively and 
formally different in two countries but the similarity in their sociolog-
ical circumstances and respective ideals, relegate their laws to the 
same family. David therefore insists that: 
[T]hese three families of law [Romano-Germanic, Common, 
and Socialist] are closely linked to the development of Euro-
pean civilisation. They reflect a way of thinking and living 
which is western; they express ideas and embody institu-
62. Id. at 28. 
63. Id. 
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tions which have been formed in the European cultural and 
historical context. Their adoption in America offered almost 
no difficulties because no indigenous civilisation could rival 
them. The only problem was their adaptation to a different 
geographical milieu.64 
So why might we treat American law as part of Western law when 
the Americans adopt a European legal transplant but not do the 
same with Muslim countries? Answer, when European law traveled 
to the Muslim world, it encountered a rival civilization, one that is 
not only legal, but also highly legalistic. So one might succeed in up-
rooting the law of a given civilization as happened in Muslim coun-
tries, however a whole civilization with its accompanying ideas and 
institutions cannot be similarly uprooted. A foreign law might "check 
in" but, sooner or later it will be haunted by the "ideas and institu-
tions" of the new/old "world," those parallel to the ones it left behind. 
Moreover, those ideas and institutions feeling deprived of their own 
law, the one they have sociologically produced, will haunt the new 
law with demands for reincarnation, local performance, or alterna-
tively, demise. Such is the logic oflaw if it is to be seriously grounded 
in social reality and the oeuvre of a particular civilization. 
Thus David declares: 
A new branch of law based on modern percepts may very 
well be accepted with the adoption of western concepts; there 
maybe more or less significant deviation from the basic or-
thodox rules, even to the point of secularising and repudiat-
ing the fundamental concepts of Muslim law. Nevertheless, 
the law of Muslim countries will still not be completely as-
similated into the Romanist family-or at least not for a 
great many years to come. Apart from any purely legal con-
sideration, jurists in Muslim countries will cling to their 
traditional ways of arguing and thinking for a long time to 
come; these are the ways of the society in which they live. If 
all trace of Muslim legal tradition is to be wiped out, not only 
the law but the whole of society will have to be altered. In 
fact, the entire Islamic civilisation would have to be 
rejected. 65 
In a "multicultural move" that echoes David's liberal ideology, he con-
cludes that given that western law will inevitably have to be "synthe-
sized, in some way relatively acceptable to the orthodox point of view, 
with methods of reasoning and an outlook moulded by the tradition of 
Muslim law," the study of Muslim law from the comparative law per-
spective will have to be pursued for a long time to come.66 So what 
64. [d. at 453. 
65. [d. at 482. 
66. [d. at 483. 
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appeared at first to be an irrational repudiation ofthe law of Muslims 
from the family of Western law of which it originated, turned out to 
be no more than respect for civilizational ontological difference. We 
have our history they have theirs; we have our ideals they have 
theirs, even if our law overtakes theirs that does not mean they be-
come us. For they have a difference which is unbridgeable even with 
the commonality of law between us. 
Interestingly, when David confronts a similar situation in Latin 
America he handles it quite differently. There too European law trav-
eled to an altogether different place, an altogether different society. 
In fact, David is struck when it comes to Latin America by the gap 
between the advanced European law adopted by the European elites 
of Latin America and the primitiveness of the society in which these 
laws are applied. There too one finds a chasm between law and soci-
ety in which it couldn't be claimed that the former is an expression of 
the latter. Yet that does not dissuade David from welcoming Latin 
American law into the warm embrace of the Western family of laws. 
Why? Because, unlike jurists in Muslim countries who according 
to David "will always cling to their traditional ways of arguing and 
thinking for a long time to come," David is able to identify with Latin 
American jurists as essentially European, like David himself. This 
presumption of European-ness allows David to put his trust in those 
jurists and to think of them as loyal to Europe and European ways, 
trustworthy in their ability to embrace European law and to inject it 
in their own primitive societies in a way that doesn't necessarily 
transform European law (as Muslims would inevitably do) but to 
merely particularize it according to local social circumstances.67 
What is peculiar is that while David's discussion of law of Mus-
lim countries seems relatively informed, his sociological comprehen-
sion of Muslim jurists leaves a lot to be desired. While David 
acknowledges the power of the transplant in Muslim countries in-
cluding its displacement of religious law, he however seems to imag-
ine that the transplant traveled magically without a Muslim jurist 
elite that would have piloted it into place, ushered it in, hosted it, 
developed it, accommodated·it, identified with it, and went into seri-
ous battle with religious jurists to defend its right of place. Oddly for 
David, while law has replaced law, jurists have not replaced jurists. 
The legal transplant in the Muslim world, unlike its equivalent in 
Latin America, is an orphan child with blond hair and blue eyes and 
no parents to claim. 
David's sense of estrangement from the secular jurists of the Is-
lamic world is the more striking given that a large number of them 
67. All the arguments that I make pertaining to David on Latin America I have 
learnt reading Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 1997 
UTAH L. REv. 425. 
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have been educated by David's mentor (Edward Lambert) ofthe Com-
parative Law Institute de Lyon, and deeply influenced by the school 
of scientific jurisprudence that had had a great deal of influence on 
David himself (Genie, Salleille, Duguit)! How can David relegate 
them to conceptual darkness when they are his intellectual com-
rades? Perhaps David finds it socially impossible for Muslims to 
share his ideals! If he did, then he might be forced to rethink his 
civilizational divisions, no matter how charitable they might have 
been in the first place. 
So while David pays homage to the transplant, he ignores its ju-
rists. Since therefore the transplant is imagined alone without any 
protectors, it will have to become "Roman like the Romans" if it 
wants to survive. It will have to give up being itself if it wants to be. A 
move familiar in Islamic law course descriptions and scholarship. 
Ugo Mattei 
In an attempt at avoiding the pitfalls of Rene David's approach 
to legal families, Ugo Mattei wrote a recent article proposing his own 
approach to the subject oflegal families.68 One of the primary aims of 
this new approach, as Mattei explains, is to re-center in comparative 
law what has been conventionally called "radically different cul-
tures"69 or what Rene David calls "other [legal] systems. "70 Mattei is 
proposing a model of categorization that aspires to more accuracy 
through incorporating a more complex understanding of legal sys-
tems especially their multi-layered quality. One of the things that 
Mattei wants to emphasize is that the common law and civil law legal 
systems are "everywhere." And so in a sense, every legal system is 
potentially a member of the Davidian Western legal family. 
However, Mattei proposes that there are other factors that influ-
ence categorization in one family or the other depending on the he-
gemony, in the practice of law in a particular country, of a certain set 
offactors. He describes those factors, following Weber, as constraints 
(of individual behavior) and he divides them into: the political, the 
traditional, and the legal. 71 So according to this typology there are 
countries, despite the presence of the Western legal transplant, 
where the practice of law is dominated by tradition, others by politics 
and others where the practice of law takes place so to speak "inside 
the law," i.e. dominated by legal technicalities, procedures and legal 
jargon. For Mattei therefore, a country might fall either under the 
rubric of "traditional law," "political law" or "professional law." 
68. Mattei, supra note 9. 
69. [d. at 60. 
70. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 8, at 27. 
71. Mattei, supra note 9, at 8. 
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I find Mattei's model to be very useful due to its attempt to cap-
ture the complexity oflegal practice in different countries. This model 
as I see it, allows recognition of professional law in a particular coun-
try but would also propose to categorize this country as a member of 
the "political law family" because it's professional law practice is sub-
ject to political hegemony (ex. Rulers influence and/or control judges) 
or alternatively a member of the "traditional law family" because of 
the hegemony of extra-legal norms and authority figures on legal 
practice (the local "Mufti" influences the way people behave more 
than the Franco-phone judge manning the civilian court). Moreover, 
according to this model one may even divide the legal practice in one 
country into particular fields, so its commercial life might be prac-
ticed "professionally," its public law "politically," its family law 
"'traditionally." 
The problem is that despite the complexity of Mattei's model and 
its great descriptive potential, it's hard to ignore the observation that 
Mattei, especially when delineating the difference between the 
"West" and the "East" when it comes to law, ends up reproducing 
David's earlier categorizations. As such, the European civilian and 
common law countries belong to the family of "professional law" (pre-
viously Western legal family), the Islamic countries, China and Ja-
pan belong to that of "traditional law" (previously "other legal 
systems"). One may introduce novel notions such as "hegemony" and 
"multiple constraints" but the East is still the East (victim to tradi-
tion) and the West is still the West (faithful to "the rule of law"). 
Moreover, it's hard to escape the implicit "normative" effect of the 
classification: rule of law, is better than tradition, any minute of the 
day. Who wants to live in the latter? In fact, the universal impulse is 
that if you want yourself "civilized," you absolutely must de-center 
tradition, and re-center whatever "rule of law" you might have. Law 
is a Western gift to East's (hopefully dying) tradition. Get 
professional! 
More importantly though, and in a move that both repeats Rene 
David's insistence on the surviving normative power of Islamic law as 
religious law despite its replacement by the legal transplant and also 
mimics the "Islamic law supremacy" of Islamic law instructors and 
scholars, Mattei gives "traditional law" in the Islamic countries a 
supra-normative power by insisting on its hegemony as a form of le-
gal practice. Indeed, as one reads on, one notices that for Mattei the 
word "Muslim" evokes "traditional law" in an associative manner, so 
much so that he only feels the need to refer to the "large Muslim pop-
ulation"72 in India (among other reasons) to make the point that In-
dian law should be considered a member of the "traditional law" 
family. 
72. [d. at 12. 
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While Mattei's categories are more complex than those of David, 
and therefore invite a more complex investigation of legal phenom-
ena, when it comes to the Islamic world, Mattei does no such thing. In 
fact he seems to pay homage to the "traditional law" of comparative 
legal literature that espouses the wisdom that law in the Islamic 
world has got to be "traditional." If Mattei took seriously the combi-
nation of the legal transplant and the nature of the contemporary 
nation state in the Islamic world, he would have seen that an accu-
rate deployment of his own categories, would lead him to a more com-
plex categorization of law in the Islamic world. For instance, and 
using Mattei's approach, I would argue that in most Muslim coun-
tries' law could be characterized as "political" when it comes to public 
law (just like Latin America), "professional" when it comes to com-
mercial law (also like Latin America), and "traditional" when it 
comes to family law. The fact that most Muslims live in authoritarian 
or pseudo-democratic nation states is to my mind far more relevant to 
our characterization of law in these countries than the fact that these 
Muslims contract their marriages and divorces following Islamic fam-
ily law. In that respect, Muslims share a great deal in common, in 
terms of the predicament of law in their countries, with equally situ-
ated Latinos, Africans and Asians. 
Once we have located law inside the nation state (and not on the 
shoulders of Muslims) we can then inspect legal phenomenon with 
the help of Mattei's categories by being attentive to the exact distri-
bution of professional law and political law in a particular state. It is 
perfectly conceivable that, in one authoritarian state, "political law" 
would overwhelm and control other practices of law, such as ones re-
lated to commerce, corporations, investments, land-tenant law, but 
then it might not. That depends on how "corrupt" the state is. So a 
country, Muslim, Latino, or African, might indeed belong to "political 
law" when it comes to say administrative and constitutional law, but 
be described as "professional" when it comes to criminal law (except 
when it comes to political opposition), "professional" when it comes to 
commercial law and land-tenant law but "political" when it comes in-
vestment law, etc. It all depends on how stable or unstable the partic-
ular regime is, how much support it had marshaled among its middle 
class, its commercial and business class, what the grounds of legiti-
macy for its continuity are, etc. 
This all leads to the conclusion that "packaging" the Islamic 
world in this manner and describing its law as traditional because it 
simply has residues of religious law is not only wrong but un-in-
sightful. Tradition and traditional law do not have much explanatory 
power in the Islamic world (and perhaps nowhere else for that mat-
ter). Leaders of Muslim countries might resort to "tradition" to beef 
up their legitimacy, as Mattei points out, but that translates into he-
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gemony of the political over the traditional not vice versa. Tradition 
is being used and manipulated, not succumbed to. What signifies po-
litical leadership in the Islamic world, at least the majority of it, is 
not that it submits to tradition, but that it uses tradition to legitimize 
its demand that the citizens of the state submit to the state's coercive 
power, its non-law. 
A concrete study of specific national legal systems and the func-
tion they perform within authoritarian nation states get us into the 
first step on the path to accurate description of law in the Islamic 
world. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving Islamic law an overarching status analytically in our ap-
proach to law in the Islamic world, distorts our understanding of le-
gal phenomena in these countries. Islamic law should be approached 
as one, but only one, of the constitutive elements of law that has not 
only been de-centered by the transplant but also transformed. Not 
only have its rules been reformed, but also its modes of reasoning, 
and its jurist class. Its treatises have been turned into codes, and its 
qadis turned into modern judges. Moreover, its internal conceptual 
organization, has been transformed by being reduced to a rule struc-
ture positivized in a code and dependent on state enforcement. Con-
sequently, its normative hold over people has changed. Islamic law is 
now largely "privatized" in voluntary acts of ritual and worship and 
consultation with religious figures as to how to treat one's wife and 
the religiously acceptable way to invest one's money. In other words, 
and as Talal AI-Assad argues in Formations of the Secular,73 a sepa-
ration between law and morality, religion being relegated to the lat-
ter, has entered the Islamic world and has cut off the continuous, 
normative and juridical hold Islamic law had had on Muslims, cover-
ing the whole spectrum of one's life-acts. Islamic law seems to have 
been itself transplanted: from the past to a present it hardly recog-
nized and therefore had to change to accommodate. 
As for the transplant itself, its familiarity should not blind us. 
Perhaps it is time that we approach it with the same tools, para-
digms, and theoretical framework as we do Western law. The recipro-
cal desire, between Islamic law scholars and Western comparatists, 
to self-exoticize on the one hand and to exoticize on the other, to rele-
gate law to Islamic law in the Islamic countries, should be resisted. 
Baudouin Dupret in an essay surveying recent French literature 
on law in the Arab world describes one such attempt at resisting the 
73. TALAL AL-AsSAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODER-
NITY (2003)_ 
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paradigm of "Islamic law."74 The study he describes is entitled The 
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt and the Protection of Funda-
mental Rights. He writes: 
This is a purely legal analysis of the case law of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt concerning public freedoms. 
It provides a complete introduction to the court, its adjudica-
tion and the normative role of the judge in his interpreta-
tion. It also raises the question of the relationship between 
the constitutional judiciary and its political environment. 
But its main value comes from the fact that it deals with an 
Arab judicial institution within the same aims and tools as 
those used for studying the American Supreme Court or the 
French Conseil constitutionnel. This kind of legal work has 
set the standard for future research in the field. It should be 
considered as a compulsory prerequisite to research on the 
socio-political dimension of Arab law in any context. 75 
A step in the right direction. 
74. Baudouin Dupret, Modern Law and Arab Societies in Recent French-Speaking 
Literature, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 289 (2000). 
75. [d. at 295. 
